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Jennifer A. Drobac*
In now-familiar language, [Title VII]forbids an employer to "fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment," or to "limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's... sex."1
I. INTRODUCTION
2!
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,2 the United States Supreme
Court ruled3 that members of one biological sex can sue members of the same sex
for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 While
appearing to confirm an expansive reading of Title VII, the Court's reasoning
carries several important negative implications for future sexual harassment cases
brought pursuant to Title VII.
First, the Court's narrow interpretation of what constitutes discrimination
because of sex implies a definition of the word "sex" that includes only
chromosomal, biological sex. Neither gender manifestations nor gendered behavior5
* Lecturer at Law, Stanford Law School. J.S.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, 2000; J.D., Stanford
Law School, 1987; A.M. (English History), Stanford University, 1987; A.B., Stanford University, 1981. 1 thank
Margaret Mar for her indefatigable critical assistance.
I. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490U.S. 228,239-40 (1989) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2002(a)(1)-
(2)).
2. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
3. Il at 1003. The Court did not determine whether Joseph Oncale had established a sexual harassment
prima facie case. It simply remanded his case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. In October
1998, less than a week before trial, the remanded case settled. L. M. Sixel, Same-Sex Harassment Suit Settled,
HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 27, 1998, at 1.
4. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2002(a)(1) (West 1995).
5. I use the term "gender" to refer to femininity, masculinity, and the individual and social constructions
and stereotypes often associated with biological sex. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994)
(Scalia, ., dissenting) (acknowledging that "[t]he word 'gender' has acquired the new and useful connotation of
cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes"); Ronald
Turner, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: A Call For Conduct-Based and Gender-Based Applications of Title VII,
5 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 151, 194-95 (1997) (distinguishing biological sex from "cultural and attitudinal gender"
and arguing against conflation of the two concepts); Anita Barnes, Note, The Sexual Continuum: Transsexual
Prisoners, 24 NEWENG. J. ON CRIM. &CIV. CONFINEMENT 599,600-03 (1998) (defining gender to include "self-
image," "stereotypes surrounding sex" and "the social construction of sex").
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are included in this definition. The Court did not even use the word "gender.",6
Second, the Court's narrow interpretation arguably insinuates a mens rea element
into the prima facie sexual harassment case, thereby threatening the viability of
"sexually charged environment" cases such as Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards.
Third, Oncale misdirects judicial scrutiny to the harasser's motivations and away
from the more appropriate focus on the alleged civil rights injury perpetrated.
Fourth, the unanimous decision reflects and fosters traditional gender stereotypes;
stereotypes that previously were found suspect in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins8
when they provide the bases for employment decisions.9 For example, the Oncale
Court interrelated the harasser's biological sex and sexual behavior using gender
stereotypes to evaluate whether conduct directed at the target was discriminatory.10
Finally, the Court emphasized "[c]ommon sense" and "social context" as important
factors in the evaluation of suspect conduct."' Court endorsement of common sense
and social context reestablishes the potential for prevalent, biased community
attitudes to insulate discriminatory practices from attack under Title VII.
This Article exposes and explores the flaws in Oncale's reasoning by first
summarizing Oncale's broad holding. 12 Because the Court found that offensive
sexual conduct alone does not support a sex discrimination claim, 3 this Article also
examines in Part IV the implications of that holding. 4 In Parts V and VI, this
Article explores the motivations that the Court identified as causing sexual
harassment: sexual desire and "sex-specific" animus.15 In Part VII, this Article deals
with the Court's emphasis on common sense and social context in the evaluation
of harassing behavior.
16
Throughout this Article, character equations illustrate the formulae Justice
Scalia proposed for evaluating harassment. These equations reveal the Court's
reliance on traditional gender stereotypes. Finally, by adopting a pansexual
6. The Court has, in other opinions, used the terms "sex" and "gender" interchangeably. See, e.g., J.E.B.,
511 U.S. at 128-29 (deciding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of "gender");
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (holding that Title VII was violated when "discriminatory
conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race,
gender, religion, or national origin"); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239-41 (1989) (using the terms "sex" and
"gender" interchangeably).
7. 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1493-1501, 152627 (1991) (describing an environment in which, inter alia, male
workers posted pictures of sexual conduct and nude women, told sexual jokes, wrote abusive language on the
walls and made references to sodomous rape).
8. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
9. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
10. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002-03 (1998).
11. Id. at 1003.
12. Infra Part ll.
13. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
14. Infra Part IV.
15. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
16. Infra Part VII.
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perspective, this Article proposes alternative equations for mapping and evaluating
sexual harassment under Title VII.
II. BACKGROUND: DEFINING PANSEXUALrTY
The term "pansexuality" is new to formal legal analysis. Formally defined:
17
[p]ansexuality 1 encompasses all kinds of sexuality. It differs, however,
from pansexualism, a perspective that declares "all desire and interest are
derived from the sex instinct."' 91 Pansexuality includes heterosexuality,
homosexuality, bisexuality, and sexual behavior that does not necessarily
involve a coupling. It includes, for example, masturbation, celibacy,
fetishism, and fantasy.1201 Moreover, pansexuality includes heteroerotic and
homoerotic play and sexual aggression, sometimes mislabeled as
"horseplay. ' '12U
I submit we are all pansexual, individually, and as a collective. Each
individual has the ability to manifest more than one form of sexuality.
Because pansexuality includes sexual fantasizing and masturbation, as well
as heterosexual or homosexual coupling activity, many individuals who
17. The following is a quotation from Jennifer Ann Drobac, Pansexuality and the Law, 5 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN &L. 297, 300-02 (1999). The footnotes are reproduced in the locations at which they appeared in the
original Essay, but have been renumbered to conform to the numerical order of this Article.
18. Pan [means] "all" or "whole:' [WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1628 (1981)
[hereinafter WEBSTER'S]]. Sexuality is defined as follows: "the quality or state of being sexual[-]... the condition,
potential, or state of readiness of the organism with regard to sexual activity." Id. at 2082. Another possible
perspective is that of unisexuality, as developed by Martine Rothblatt:
The paradigm of sexual continuity points out that all persons are inherently bisexual but uses the term
unisexual to reflect this potentiality. The term unisexual is used to avoid the implication that there are
but two ("bi") sexes from which to choose lovers. Unisexual emphasizes the uniqueness of our
sexuality and that of our lover. It also emphasizes the oneness of sexual continuity, just as the word
universe means one reality full of diversity.
[MARTINE ROTHBLATr, THE APARTHEID OF SEX: A MANIFESTO ON THE FREEDOM OF GENDER 141 (1995)]; see
also id. at 143-48. Rothblatt's unisexuality appears very similar to the concept of pansexuality. Unisexuality's
continuum seems more restrictive, however, than pansexuality's multidimensional perspective. For this reason,
I prefer the term pansexual but I endorse Rothblatt's concept, which deconstructs the strict interrelation of
biological sex and sexual behavior.
19. WEBSTER'S, supra note [18], at 1631. Pansexualism is further defined as "the suffusion of all
experience and conduct with erotic feeling:' 1l
20. Fantasizing may not constitute a "behavior" for behavioral scientists. As a scientific layperson,
however, I consider thinking to be an activity, which is, in some measure, personally regulable. Moreover, I
believe that thoughts, as well as observable actions, define our individual sexuality. Additionally, I include both
flirtation and courtship in the list of pansexual behaviors. I consider both to be a sexualized form of social
interaction that initiates sexual activity. But cf. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003
(1998) (describing "intersexual flirtation" as "ordinary socializing").
21. Horseplay is defined as "rough or boisterous play." WEBSTE'S, supra note [18], at 1093. Note that
this definition includes neither a sexual element nor animus. Cf. Oncale, 118 S. CL at 1003. (describing "male-on-
male horseplay" as "ordinary socializing").
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formerly might have fallen into one category now fit into two or more
categories.
Some individuals, who engage sexually with only one other person, may
never fantasize or masturbate. Even those persons, however, may be
pansexuals with moral codes that tolerate only one type of expression or
behavior. For example, a priest might once have been a heterosexual who
fantasized and masturbated. Even in choosing a life of celibacy, that priest
is still a pansexual whose vows constrain his sexual expression. This
example highlights [the fact] that individual sexuality, like religious
conviction and practice, can change and evolve.22
Pansexuality provides a useful tool for understanding Oncale because, as a
concept, pansexuality deconstructs the stereotypical interrelation of biological sex
and sexual behavior prevalent in American society.' From a pansexual perspective,
men do not necessarily behave in one manner and women in another. Additionally,
people are not simply heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual. The pansexual
perspective helps to identify stereotypical assumptions made in Oncale.
I. ONCALE's BROAD HOLDING
"[I]n the interest of both brevity and dignity," the Oncale Court offered only an
abbreviated recitation of the facts.24 Joseph Oncale worked as a roustabout5 on an
22. See supra note 17 (providing the citation information for this quotation, and explaining the reason for
the altered footnote numbers).
23. See, e.g., THEBoSTONWOMEN'SHEALTHBOOKCOLLEcrTvE,THENEWOURBODIESOURSELVES 185
(1984) (describing prominent stereotypes that interrelate biological sex and sexual behavior). "Men are 'supposed'
to know more about sex, to initiate it, to have a stronger sex drive. Women are 'supposed' to be passive recipients
or willing students. Supposedly they want sex and we want love. Such rigid classifying of people by gender is
false, silly and damaging." la; see also READER'S DIOEST, GUIDETO LOvE & SEx 65 (Dr. Amanda Roberts & Dr.
Barbara Padgett-Yawn consulting eds., 1998)
(Sex researchers now know that fantasies play as important a part in a woman's sexual behavior as they
do in a man's .... As a rule, more men have fantasies in which they are the dominant partner while
more women imagine situations in which they play a submissive role. With fantasies, however, as with
most other aspects of sexual behavior, numerous exceptions exist to such rules.)
Id. Even though Reader's Digest acknowledges numerous exceptions, it still categorizes some sexual behaviors
as more typically female, and attributes others to men.
24. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000. Lambda supervising attorney Jon Davidson lambasted the Court for its
failure to address the facts fully: "'Brevity?'... 'Give me a break. The Supreme Court writes opinions that are
hundreds of pages long. It's not like they were running out of space."' Jenna Ward, High Court's Oncale May Cut
Both Ways, RECORDER (San Francisco, Cal.), Mar. 5, 1998, at A-1 (quoting Jon Davidson).
I agree with Davidson that the Court's failure to relate the facts reveals its "squeamishness" and
"homophobia." Id. I also think its failure suggests a certain sexism. Justice Scalia used approximately 75 words
and vague references to describe the abuse Joseph Oncale suffered. Justice Rehnquist used twice that number to
describe the facts concerning Michelle Vinson's harassment in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60-
61 (1986). Justice O'Connor used approximately three times that number to describe the abuse Teresa Harris
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oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico.26 His supervisor, John Lyons, together with two
co-workers, physically and verbally abused Oncale in the manner described by the
appellate court:
[T]he harassment included Pippen and Johnson restraining [Oncale] while
Lyons placed his penis on Oncale's neck, on one occasion, and on Oncale's
arm, on another occasion; threats of homosexual rape by Lyons and Pippen;
and the use of force by Lyons to push a bar of soap into Oncale's anus
while Pippen restrained Oncale as he was showering on Sundowner
premises. Oncale alleges both quid pro quo and hostile work environment
sexual harassment. 27
Oncale complained to Sundowner management but obtained no relief.28 On one
occasion, in response to Oncale's complaints, a company safety clerk "called him
a name suggesting homosexuality." 29 Oncale quit after the shower incident and later
explained, "'I felt that if I didn't leave my job, that [sic] I would be raped or forced
to have sex." 30 Relying on precedent that precluded same-sex harassment relief, the
appellate court dismissed the case.31
The Court commenced its review by confirming that Title VII protects both
men and women.32 Relying on Title Vli's language and Johnson v. Transportation
Agency,33 in which the Court considered the discrimination claims by a male worker
against his male superior, the Court reasoned that the statute does not bar same-sex
suits.34 The Court rejected circuit court cases finding both that same-sex harassment
is "actionable only if the plaintiff can prove the perpetrator is homosexual (and thus
motivated by sexual desire)," 35 and those holding that sexual conduct is always
actionable. 36 Explaining that same-sex harassment suits will not "transform Title
suffered in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993). Courts must relate fully the alleged abuses so
that the public can understand the harm perpetrated and so that precedent reveals "all the circumstances." Id. at
23.
25. See WEBSTER'S, supra note [18], at 1980 (defining a "roustabout" as a "deckhand[,] a semiskilled
laborer" and "one working in an oil field or refinery").
26. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000.
27. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998
(1998).




32. Id. (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983)).
33. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
34. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001-02 (discussing Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)).
35. Id. at 1002 (citing McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996)).
36. Id. (rejecting McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996), andDoe
v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted and vacated, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998)).
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VII into a general civility code,"37 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
emphasized that plaintiffs must still prove first that the harassment was because of
sex,38 and second, that the harassment was "severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment.
' 39
The Court explored several ways in which plaintiffs might prove that alleged
harassment constituted "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex., 40 Justice Scalia
suggested that proof of the perpetrator's sex-specific desire or proof of hostility
would demonstrate discriminatory motivation.4' Alternately, he implied that
evidence of disparate treatment of male and female workers would supply the
necessary proof.42 Notably, each method involves proving the harasser's
motivation-indicative of intent-or intent itself.43 Each method also suggests that
"sex" means only chromosomal, biological sex: not gender. Additionally, Justice
Scalia emphasized that sexual conduct alone does not demonstrate discrimination
because of sex.44
Finally, the Court elaborated on the requirement that the harassment be severe
or pervasive.45 It affirmed its holdings in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson46 and
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.47 by holding "that the objective severity of
harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances.' 48 The Court introduced the
notion, however, that "common sense" and "social context" play a role in the
objective analysis of harassing behaviors.49
IV. DEFINING SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY PERPETRATOR
MOTIVATIONS RATHER THAN CONDUCT
In Oncale, the Court focused on the harasser's motivations-whether
determined by sex-specific desire or animus-rather than on the nature of the injury
to identify discriminatory conduct.50 This change of focus risks altering the prima
37. Id. at 1002.
38. 14
39. Id. at 1003 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21(1993)).
40. Id. at 1002 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2002(a)(1)-(2)) (alteration in original).
41. Id.
42. See id. (explaining that "[a] same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct comparative
evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace").
43. In McDonnell v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). the Court specified that when direct evidence of
discriminatory intent is not available, plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent in disparate treatment cases by
using circumstantial evidence. Id at 802.
44. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
45. Id at 1003.
46. 477 U.S. 57.
47. 510 U.S. 17.
48. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1002.
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facie case in sexual harassment cases. Never before has the law required a mens rea
element in such cases.5' Courts have correctly concentrated on the conduct and
nature of the injury-the civil rights violation-and not on the perpetrator's intent.
For example, in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,52 what the men intended when
they posted pictures of nude or partially clad women in the workplace did not
matter.53 The men may have been conforming mindlessly to habits established as
a matter of social custom, but they demeaned women by denying them the
opportunity to work in an environment free of gender stereotyping and the
objectification of women.54 In Robinson, Judge Melton explained:
A third category of actionable conduct is behavior that is not directed at a
particular individual or group of individuals, but is disproportionately more
offensive or demeaning to one sex .... This third category describes
behavior that creates a barrier to the progress of women in the workplace
because it conveys the message that they do not belong, that they are
welcome in the workplace only if they will subvert their identities to the
sexual stereotypes prevalent in that environment. 55
51. See generally Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(enumerating the prima facie elements for co-worker harassment:
Five elements comprise a claim of sexual discrimination based on the existence of a hostile work
environment: (1) plaintiff belongs to a protected category; (2) plaintiff was subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based upon sex; (4) the harassment
complained of affected a term, condition or privilege of employment; and (5) respondeat superior, that
is, defendants knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt, effective
remedial action.).
For'situations involving supervisor harassment with no tangible employment action, the Court has modified
"only the fifth element of the prima facie case. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998)
(holding employers vicariously liable for such harassment, subject to an affirmative defense: an anti-harassment
policy that an employee unreasonably failed to invoke); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2279
(1998) (same).
52. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.1991).
53. Id. at 1522-23.
54. An approach to sexual harassment that focuses on the conduct and resulting injuries, and not on the
harasser's motivations, may attract the First Amendment free speech defense. An examination of the First
Amendment defense is beyond the scope of this Article, but was addressed and rejected by Judge Melton in the
Robinson case. He explained in part:
mhe pictures and verbal harassment are not protected speech because they act as discriminatory
conduct in the form of a hostile work environment. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
628 (1984) ("[P]otentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their
communicative impact... are entitled to no constitutional protection.") .... In this respect, the speech
at issue is indistinguishable from the speech that comprises a crime, such as threats of violence or
blackmail, of which there can be no doubt of the authority of a state to punish.
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (parallel citations omitted); see R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1992) (explaining that, under Title VII, "government does not target
conduct on the basis of its expressive content"); see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993)
(confirming the R.A.V Court's determination that Title VII permissibly regulates conduct in a content-neutral
fashion).
55. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522-23 (citations omitted).
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This holding demonstrates that the behavior itself, separate and apart from the
motivations of the perpetrator, discriminates. The proliferation of nude pictures and
literature in a sexually charged environment 56 has a disparate impact on women in
that it objectifies and demeans them. Such a workplace has a different but arguably
objectionable impact on men in that it fosters a male stereotype and enforces the
rule that men either appreciate or should tolerate this objectification of women. The
prima facie elements in a disparate impact case do not include proof of intent.5 7 A
simple character equation maps this reasoning:
58
(e" or ) + ooSEVo + (d' or =
actionable harassment because of sex
Particularly because sexual behavior itself has been actionable, courts have
sanctioned sexually charged workplaces only if the sexual harassment has surpassed
a high threshold. Specifically, the behavior must have been severe or pervasive and
offensive to the reasonable person, as well as to the individual victim.59
Two negative consequences result if the harasser's intent becomes an element
of the sexual harassment prima facie case. First, the sexual harassment plaintiff's
burden of proof increases exponentially. Proving conduct is a much easier task than
proving conduct and intent. Second, an entire subset of hostile work environment
behaviors-those which make for a sexually charged work environment-might no
longer be actionable. More specifically, because many workers who post nude
pictures or pervasively make lewd jokes have no specific intent to target the
victims, and in fact may impact both men and women, their sexually charged and
offensive actions may fall from the list of offending behaviors.
Might the Oncale Court possibly have intended to eliminate the sexually
charged workplace from the list of actionable offenses? In Oncale, Justice Scalia
declared:
We have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between
men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely
because the words used have a sexual content or connotations. "The critical
issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed
56. The character equations herein use the symbol "oPE.c to refer to the phrase "sexually charged
environment." For further explanation, see the accompanying Appendix.
57. International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971).
58. The accompanying Appendix provides a symbol legend.
59. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21-22 (1993).
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to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members
of the other sex are not exposed." 6
The Supreme Court may never have found discrimination solely from sexual words
or behaviors, but lower courts such as the Robinson court have done so for years by
finding that workplaces replete with nude posters, sexual objects, sexual banter, and
lewd jokes violate Title VII.61 Moreover, the Court's attitude regarding offensive
sexual behavior contradicts its position concerning hostile behavior. The Court
rejected the notion that sexual behavior alone can demonstrate discrimination, but
in the same brief opinion suggested that "a trier of fact might reasonably find such
discrimination... [when] sex-specific derogatory terms ... make it clear that the
harasser is motivated by general hostility" toward that sex.62
By vacating Doe v. City of Belleville 63 and rejecting the possibility that severe
or pervasive sexual conduct alone constitutes sexual harassment and, therefore, sex
discrimination, the Court eliminated the only form of hostile work environment
behavior that does not bear an associated mental state or motivation. Arguably,
then, when Justice Scalia required a finding of discrimination "because
of... sex," 64 he added a mens rea element to the sexual harassment prima facie
case.
V. SEXUAL HARASSMENT MOTIVATED BY SEXUAL DESIRE
Having rejected sexual conduct alone as sufficient to demonstrate
discrimination, the Oncale Court then examined conduct motivated by sex-specific
desire. Justice Scalia suggested that social context would influence the
interpretation of the particular behaviors.6 Justice Scalia reasoned that if a male
perpetrator proposed sexual activity, either explicitly or implicitly, to a female
target, courts could reasonably presume that the harassment was because of sex.
60. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at
25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
61. E.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522-23 (M.D. Fla. 1991); see Doe v.
City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563,580 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998) (reasoning that "when one's
genitals are grabbed, when one is denigrated in gender specific-language, and when one is threatened with sexual
assault, it would seem... impossible to de-link the harassment from the gender of the individual harassed");
Shrout v. Black Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774, 779-80 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (discussing a sexually suggestive
magazine); Boyd v. James S. Hayes Living Health Care Agency, 671 F. Supp. 1155, 1158-59 (W.D. Tenn. 1987)
(concerning a pornographic movie and the distribution of pornographic literature); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs.
Corp., 699 F. Supp. 569,573 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (addressing, among other things, pornographic magazines, vulgar
comments, sexually oriented pictures in a slide presentation and sexually oriented calendars).
62. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002; see also infra note 89 and accompanying text (commenting upon the
Court's inquiry into sex-specific animus).
63. 119 R3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
64. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
65. Id. at 1003.
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The Court added, "[I]t is reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been
made to someone of the same sex." 66 Similarly, if credible evidence suggested that
a male perpetrator was homosexual and he proposed sexual activity to a male target,
courts could reasonably conclude that the harassment was because of sex.67
Character equations map the Court's reasoning:
68
Heterood + SEX+ $ = actionable harassment because of sex fl
Hetero + SX+ e = actionable harassment because of sex
Hetero + SEX+ e o actionable harassment because of sex/f
Hetero$ + SEX+ $ o actionable harassment because of sex
Homooe + .SEX + e' actionable harassment because of sex fl
Homo + SEX + =actionable harassment because of sex
The Court's reasoning carries several important implications. First, implied but
unstated in Justice Scalia's opinion is the notion that courts may presume that
perpetrators are heterosexual unless proven homosexual. Such a presumption
reflects a heterocentrist world view and completely ignores the case of the bisexual
or equal opportunity harasser. To apply Justice Scalia's reasoning in that situation,
one must determine "'whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
66. Id. at 1002.
67. Id. Because the presumption attached to inter-sex behavior is not available for intra-sex offenses,
plaintiffs in same-sex cases suffer a more onerous burden of proof. Erin J. Law, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.: The United States Supreme Court Holds That Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Is Actionable Under
1tle VII, 73 TUL. L. REV. 723,735 (1998).
68. The Court referred to "male-female sexual harassment situations." Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002. While
such phrasing conceivably includes female sexual predation, common interpretation might lead to the conclusion
that the Court expected sexual predators to be men. Assuming that the Court meant to connote a sex-neutral
interpretation, however, I have included the example of the female harasser in the character equations.
69. The term "equal opportunity harasser" is not new to this analysis. This term was utilized in two briefs
submitted to the Supreme Court in conjunction with the Oncale case: Brief of Nation Organization on Male Sexual
Victimization, Inc. at 22, Oncale (No. 96-568), available in 1997 WL 471814 [hereinafter Male Sexual
Victimization Brief]; and Brief of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund at 21-23, Oncale (No. 95-568).
1278
McGeorge Law Review / VoL 30
exposed.""'7 Arguably, bisexual harassers avoid liability under Title VII because
they target both men and women. Thus, their behavior is not discrimination because
of sex:
(Bid or Big) + SEX+ (d' & $) o actionable harassment because of sex
Some courts have recognized that the equal opportunity harasser's behavior
occurs because of sex in that it discriminates against both men and women. 1 One
can make an analogy to race cases to explain this reasoning, just as Oncale relied
on race case precedent to explain that a person can discriminate against someone
of the same sex.72 For example, in a race case, a perpefrator who discriminates
against African Americans, Asians, and whites by using different racial epithets is
no less racist than one who discriminates against only one race. Likewise, an equal
opportunity harasser is no less a discriminator than the equal opportunity racist.
Arguably, a perpetrator who calls all workers, regardless of race, "niggers"
discriminates, and is liable to any person so called.73 Similarly, a perpetrator who
refers to his co-workers as "pussies" harasses, regardless of each target's sex.74 The
scenario of the equal opportunity harasser and the arguments that address this
70. Oncale, 118 S. CL at 1002 (emphasis added) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25
(1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). One wonders how the Court defined "exposure." For example, an employee
might be exposed to offensive conduct without being the target of it. Alternatively, one might argue that an
employee who is aware of harassment but not the target of it is not exposed to it. I think Justice Scalia meant the
second, more narrow definition. This narrow definition is inconsistent, however, with Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission policy, which recognizes the standing of any employee protesting employer
discrimination. See Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553, 1557 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (holding that
"[t]he EEOC interprets Title VII to afford standing to anyone protesting any form of alleged employer
discrimination, on the theory that all employees have a right to work in an atmosphere free from unlawful
employment practices").
71. See, e.g., Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a
reasonable woman might be affected differently than a reasonable man); Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13
F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that a harasser who abused all employees might have been more abusive
to women than men).
72. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001 (citing Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,499 (1977)).
73. See Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a white
employee may bring a hostile work environment claim against an employer that engaged in discrimination against
African American employees).
74. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Policy Guidance on Sexual
Favoritism, both men and women may sue when confronted with an "atmosphere demeaning to women" if they
can establish that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile working environment. & FAIR
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE MANUAL (BNA) part C, at 405:6819-21 (1990); see also Sims v. Montgomery County
Comm., 766 F. Supp. 1052, 1074 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (deciding that the harassment against women created a hostile
environment for "those male officers who harbor a respect and concern for all their fellow officers, irrespective
of their sex, and who find offensive to their conscience ... an environment in which all officers.., cannot share
equally in the opportunities of employment").
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situation reveal the flawed and underinclusive nature of the Oncale reasoning and
its heterocentrist perspective.
The Court's second assumption, that heterosexuals do not make sexual
advances toward persons of the same sex, suggests that in same-sex-sexual-advance
cases, courts may find only homosexuals liable. In fact, perpetrators who have
active heterosexual lives and who self-identify as heterosexuals may find erotic and
sexually stimulating the same-sex sexual advances and aggressions committed
against Joseph Oncale.75 To deny the possibility that heterosexuals can find
homoerotic advances and aggressions stimulating, Justice Scalia ignores his own
advice in Oncale: "Because of the many facets of human motivation, it would be
unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will
not discriminate against other members of that group.' 6
Additionally, the presumptions that perpetrators are heterosexual unless proven
otherwise, and that only homosexuals make actionable sexual advances to persons
of the same sex, encourage the exploitation of homophobic attitudes by increasing
the chance that plaintiffs, as well as others, will label perpetrators in same-sex cases
as homosexual-even when they are not.' Reports indicate that the parties in
Oncale were all heterosexual."8 However, Joseph Oncale accused his harassers of
being homosexual: "I feel that they made homosexual advances toward me. I feel
they are homosexuals." 79 Clearly, such labeling can change the interpretation of the
harassers' behaviors in Oncale's heterocentrist world, as illustrated by the
preceding character equations.
Justice Scalia's requirement that credible evidence of homosexuality justify a
presumption of discrimination in same-sex cases may not save many heterosexuals
from being labeled homosexual. What constitutes credible evidence of
homosexuality? For example, is a man who masturbates homosexual? Maybe not.
Is a man who has sexual fantasies of other men homosexual? Is a man who has
experienced sexual arousal from homoerotic literature homosexual? Is a man who
has had one sexual encounter with another man homosexual? Surely, a man who is
married is heterosexual, right? Not necessarily. Author Carren Strock discovered
75. Both the Supreme Court and the appellate courts noted that Oncale's supervisor threatened him with
rape. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118 (5th Cir. 1996),
rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). While the threat of rape constitutes a threat of sexual violence, courts may also deem
ita sexual advance. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001; Oncale, 83 F.3d at 118; see also infra note 103 and accompanying
text (noting that homoerotic play and aggression have not been studied).
76. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,499 (1977)).
77. "The Fifth Circuit described the threats to Oncale as 'threats of homosexual rape' but did not address
sexual orientation, Oncale, 83 F.3d at 118, nor do the certified questions in this case state an issue of
homosexuality as such." Male Sexual Victimization Brief, supra note 69, at 23 n.7.
78. The Right Law?, NAT'LLJ., Oct. 20,1997, at A26; Richard Carelli, Supreme Court Hears Arguments
In Same-Sex Harassment, DAILY REc. (Baltimore, Md.), Dec. 4, 1997, at 14; Petitioner's Brief at 18-19, Oncale,
(No. 96-568), available in 1997 WL 458826.
79. Male Sexual Victimization Brief, supra note 69, at 23 n.7 (quoting Oncale Deposition, Jan. 20, 1995
at 41:23-24).
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after 25 years of marriage to a man that she was a lesbian.80 Moreover, people who
appear less masculine or feminine than "typical" heterosexuals may attract the
homosexual label, as did Joseph Oncale from the Sundowner safety clerk.8' Oncale
invites an epidemic of investigations regarding the perpetrator's sexuality in sexual
harassment cases, but courts may have trouble defining an individual's sexuality.
Like Justice Scalia, who presumes that perpetrators are heterosexual unless
proven homosexual and that heterosexual men make sexual advances only toward
women, many Americans interrelate biological sex and sexuality using traditional
gender stereotypes.82 The presumption is that "real" men and women, who deserve
the protection of Title VII, are heterosexual. Psychologists have discussed this
interrelation when studying male sexual harassment targets:
It is not effeminate men's gender or gay men's "affectional preference" per
se that is targeted; if it were, then perpetrators would harass everyone who
appears feminine or [appears] to prefer a male sexual partner to a female
sexual partner-women as well as men. Rather, it is the fact that the target
is a man who is presumed to prefer a male sexual partner or who looks or
acts "effeminate" that the perpetrators find objectionable; it is this
interaction of biological sex and behavior that forms the basis of their
actions.83
This passage demonstrates the interrelation between gender stereotyping and
biological sex and behavior. Those courts that exclude homosexuals and
transgendered persons from Title VII protection mistakenly fall to recognize the
interrelation between sex and sexual behavior based on stereotypes."
In Oncale, the Court failed to recognize that it interrelated the perpetrator's sex
and sexual behavior using narrow gender stereotypes to define discrimination
"because of . . .sex."8 5 The character equations illustrating Justice Scalia's
reasoning reveal the gender stereotyping, and show that many sexual offenses that
fail to fit the narrow categories will remain unaddressed. For example, Oncale may
prevent the application of Title VII in a case in which a heterosexual man makes
sexual advances toward an effeminate heterosexual man in order to demean and
80. Carren Strock, My Turn: A Painfid Discovery, NEWSWEEK, May 8, 1998, at 16; see generally CARREN
STROCK, MARRIED WOMEN WHO LOVE WOMEN (1998) (discussing the reasons that some married women are
lesbians).
81. See supra text accompanying note 29 (noting that Joseph Oncale was labeled homosexual by a co-
worker).
82. See supra text accompanying note 23 (detailing the prevailing American stereotypes).
83. Craig R- Waldo et al., Are Men Sexually Harassed? IfSo, by Whom?, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 59,63
(1998).
84. See, e.g., Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that
"Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals").
85. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).
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disempower the effeminate man in the workplace.86 In such a case, the perpetrators
are not motivated by sexual desire, but perhaps by the desire to reinforce their own
traditional masculinity and associated power, or by animosity directed at
nonconformist gender: male effeminacy. Because the animosity does not extend to
all men, the target may have no recourse.
Such reasoning creates a tension between Oncale and Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins. In Price Waterhouse, an accounting firm failed to promote Anne
Hopkins to partner because she failed, in part, to "'walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry."" 8 The Court determined that discrimination by gender stereotyping is sex
discrimination:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when
an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group, for "'[i]n forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex,
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. '' 39
This passage confirms that employers requiring employees to behave according to
traditional gender stereotypes, and those sanctioning such a requirement by co-
workers, violate Title VII. Thus arises the following character equation:
(ei &/or ?) + ((stereoeenforce + d) &/or (stereo. enforce+ -)) =
actionable harassment because of sex
86. Ironically, this scenario closely resembles the Oncale fact pattern.
87. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, the Court stated, "We have not in the past required women
whose gender has proved relevant to an employment decision to establish the negative proposition that they would
not have been subject to that decision had they been men, and we do not do so today." Id. at 248.
88. Id. at 235 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985), ajfd in part
& rev'd in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), afftd, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
89. Id. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,707, n.13 (1978)
(quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))); see also Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at
1001 ("We have held that [Title VII] not only covers 'terms' and 'conditions' in the narrow contractual sense, but
'evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in
employment.' (quoting Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986))). But see Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 294 ("I think it is important to stress that Title VII creates no independent cause of action for sex
stereotyping. Evidence of use by decisionmakers of sex stereotypes is, of course, quite relevant to the question
of discriminatory intent. The ultimate question, however, is whether discrimination caused the plaintiff's harm.")
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Because Oncale used gender stereotypes to interrelate the perpetrator's
biological sex with sexual behavior to identify discriminatory motivation, the
opinion is arguably inconsistent with the holding in Price Waterhouse. Similarly,
a court that refuses to acknowledge the civil rights injury perpetrated against
effeminate men, homosexuals, transgendered persons, and bisexuals violates Price
Waterhouse and, arguably, Title VII.
A new approach exists that could reconcile Price Waterhouse and the
evaluation of sexual harassment. A perspective that assumes all employees (and
employers) are pansexual deconstructs the gendered, stereotypical interrelation
between biological sex and sexual behavior. Pansexuals who make offensive sexual
advances to pansexual men or women, whether severely or pervasively,
discriminate because of sex. Mapped in character equations, this is as follows:
90
oP+SEX+ ? =becauseof sex / ? +SEX+ e=
actionable harassment because of sex
e? + SEX+ = because of sex l + SEX+ =
actionable harassment because of sex
or
(e &/or $) + SEX+ (e &/or?)=
actionable harassment because of sex
These equations are identical to several noted earlier that represent Justice Scalia's
formulae for sex-specific, desire-motivated harassment, except that the gender-
stereotyped orientation labels for the perpetrators have been removed. "Real" men
and women are not always heterosexual; bisexuals can discriminate against both
men and women; heterosexuals may obtain sexual gratification from behaviors with
persons of the same sex; and homosexuals are not necessarily satisfying sexual
desires if they engage in same-sex behaviors "commonly" found objectively
1283
90. As with other forms of hostile-work-environment harassment, the plaintiff still must prove in the prima
facie case that: (1) the behavior constituted objectively "severe or pervasive" harassment; and (2) the plaintiff
subjectively found that harassment to have been offensive. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
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acceptable between heterosexuals.9' Ironically, these equations reveal from a
pansexual perspective that sexual advances-as manifested by conduct alone--can
indicate discrimination because of sex.
If we are all truly pansexual, then the sex of the harasser should make no
difference in Title VII harassment equations. One could not presume that men who
harass women intend to do so because of the targets' sex. Moreover, pansexuality
rescues us from the knotty task of unweaving and identifying all the behaviors that
can constitute homosexuality, and can thereby distinguish a homosexual from a
heterosexual. Pansexuality, applied in the sex discrimination context, forces us to
focus on the alleged civil rights injury perpetrated rather than on the harasser's
motivations or sex.92 It redirects our focus onto demeaning sexual or hostile
behavior that injures men or women by denying them the employment opportunities
enjoyed by workers who exhibit different or nonconformist sex traits or practices.
Finally, the pansexual perspective works in scenarios other than sexual desire cases.
VI. SEXUAL HARASSMENT MOTIVATED BY GENDER HOSTILITY
In Oncale, the Court evaluated the perpetrator's sexuality to detect sexual desire
and define conduct "because of... sex." However, because all the Oncale parties
were self-identified heterosexuals, Justice Scalia's sexual desire formulae, which
was based on gender stereotypes, did not apply. Therefore, the Court also explored
sex-specific animus to define offensive conduct.93 The Court reasoned that hostility
toward a particular sex might motivate a harasser to speak in sex-specific
91. For example, the homosexual football coach may not be making a sexual advance toward a player when
he smacks that player's buttocks. Conceivably, the coach is simply camouflaging his homosexual identity by
emulating the behaviors of heterosexual coaches. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002-03 (raising the scenario of the
(presumably heterosexual) coach smacking a player on the field, and finding no abuse).
92. Compare sex discrimination to race discrimination. Did it really matter whether the bus driver who told
Rosa Parks to sit at the back of the bus intended to discriminate against her because she was African American?
No. Neither did it matter what his, the bus driver's, race or sexual orientation or religious beliefs were. The civil
rights injury commenced with the driver's conduct and resulted in Ms. Parks' insult.
93. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
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derogatory terms or otherwise treat persons of one sex differently from persons of
the other sex. Again, character equations track the Court's reasoning:
(d' and/or $) + crwostifity + d? = actionable harassment because of sex II
(c? and/or $) + T hostitt + $ = actionable harassment because of sex
Upon first glance, these equations do not appear to contain the problematic
stereotypes of the first ones. Look more closely, however. These equations carry a
latent heterocentrist perspective. Another way to craft them is as follows:
(d, and/or ) + (c~o~stifty + Heteroa) or (* hostifit+ Hetero ) =
actionable harassment because of sex
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If the target is homosexual, most courts will refuse to invoke Title Vl's
protections. 4 Therefore,
(o'hostifty + Homo(?) = (homohostiity+ Homod')LI actionable harassment because of sex
(Thostiaty+ Homo,) = (homohostiity + Homo,) o
actionable harassment because of sex
Courts have ruled that harassment targeting homosexuals constitutes harassment not
because of sex, but because of sexual orientation. 95 Title VU does not protect
against discrimination because of sexual orientation . 6 Thus, only heterosexuals
enjoy Title VII protection.97 In sex-specific animus cases, as in sex-specific desire
cases, stereotypical notions concerning sexuality govern the determination of
discrimination "because of ... sex."
94. See, e.g., Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. 876 F.2d 69,70 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that Title
VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals).
95. DeSaints v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327,329-30 (9th Cir. 1979). In 1996, Congress defeated,
by one vote, the Employee Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), legislation that would have added sexual orientation
to the list of characteristics recognized under Title VII. David E. Rovella, Gay Groups Are Angry at Sexual
Preference Ruling, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 10, 1997, at A9.
96. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2002(a)(1)-(2).
97. Let us entertain this query: what would happen if males, hoping to exclude women from the males'
workplace, engaged in hostile behavior with all heterosexual women but not with the lone lesbian? Could these
men avoid liability for gender animus claiming that they were hostile only to heterosexuals and not all women
and, therefore, that Title VII does not apply to their behavior?
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If the Court were to take a pansexual perspective, the sexuality of the parties
would not matter because the Court would assume all parties to be pansexual. The
Court could adopt an orientation-neutral perspective, devoid of gender stereotyping:
98
(oe and/or ) + ((e'fostgity+ e) &Ior ($ hostitty+ ?)) =
actionable harassment because of sex
With a pansexual perspective, the original sex-specific animus equation carries no
latent stereotyping.
VII. SEXUAL HARASSMENT DETERMINED BY COMMON
SENSE AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
The hypothetical Justice Scalia crafted to clarify the Court's point regarding the
influence of context in Oncale aptly demonstrates Oncale's flaws, and invites
further exploration of the pansexual perspective. Justice Scalia reasoned, "A
professional football player's working environment is not severely or pervasively
abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the
field-even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by
the coach's secretary (male or female) back at the office." 99 In this hypothetical,
Justice Scalia assumes that: (1) the football coach is male; (2) the male football
coach is heterosexual; (3) the football player is male; and (4) butt-smacking on a
football field is not sexual whereas it is either sexual or hostile at the office. Taking
a pansexual, gender-neutral approach, we would acknowledge that: (1) male
coaches are sometimes homosexual (in addition to being pansexual); (2) coaches
are occasionally female; (3) women play professional sports; and (4) on-field butt-
smacking may be sexual (or hostile).
98. Note that this equation specifies that the hostility directed toward men is sex-specific and is not the
same as the hostility directed toward women. Random hostility is not actionable; it is not illegal for an employer
to be a jerk. One can imagine a scenario, however, in which a perpetrator targets effeminate men and all women.
See, e.g., Vicki Shultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALELJ. 1683, 1787-88 & n.534 (1998). Such
a scenario would be expressed in the form of the following equation:
d + (tenforce+ ehostilty+ e') + ($Ahstility ) = actionable harassment because of sex
99. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003. I acknowledge that "buttocks" is the formal, polite term for the gluteus




If Justice Scalia's coach were homosexual, would butt-smacking still be
nonsexual? Some male players might not feel comfortable having their butts
smacked by a homosexual coach. To those players, butt-smacking might then
connote a sexual advance, just as it would in Justice Scalia's hypothetical office.
Using Justice Scalia's formulae, courts could reasonably conclude that a
homosexual male coach sexually harasses a male player by smacking his butt.
However, what if this homosexual coach did not intend the contact to be sexual?
What if he merely smacked male butts, as some heterosexual coaches do, to give
praise, support and encouragement? Justice Scalia's list of stereotypes does not
include the "innocent" homosexual who engages in behavior perpetrated regularly
by heterosexuals. Using Oncale's reasoning, a court could discriminate against
homosexuals for engaging in exactly the same behaviors in which heterosexuals
engage.
Using a pansexual perspective to evaluate the male coach's behavior, one
would focus not on his motivation or sexuality, but on the conduct and alleged
injury. Obviously, the case arises only if someone finds butt-smacking offensive.'°°
Justice Scalia assumes that on-field butt-smacking is not a sexual behavior-but is
this assumption true from apansexual perspective? How we interpret butt-smacking
can affect the outcome of seemingly identical cases. Justice Scalia assumes that
male-male butt-smacking is nonsexual because, in part, he assumes the actors are
heterosexual. Perhaps butt-smacking is homoerotic play, however. Homophobic
actors and observers will refuse to characterize behavior as homoerotic when doing
so could call into question their own, perhaps rigidly self-defined, sexuality.
Alternatively, on-field butt-smacking could signal, in a sexual manner, the type
of dominance and power that enforces traditional male stereotypes. "Such behavior
can be interpreted as arising from the societal devaluation of femininity and the
complementary valorization of male heterosexuality and masculinity."'' l In their
recent study of sexually harassed men, Craig Waldo, Jennifer Berdahl and Louise
Fitzgerald found:
[M]en reported that other men were more likely than women to target them
for sexual harassment. Men . . . were significantly more likely to
experience lewd comments and enforcement of the male gender role from
other men than from women.... Similar results were found in [another
sample group] .... [A third sample of men showed] a comparable pattern
of results .... with the exception that men in this group were more likely
to report experiences of unwanted sexual attention from women and were
100. Only unwelcome conduct is actionable as harassment under Title VII. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) ("The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
'unwelcome.' 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985).').
101. Waldo et al., supra note 83, at 61.
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not more likely [but rather, were equally likely] to experience enforcement
of the male gender role from other men."
I contacted both Fitzgerald and Waldo to inquire whether anyone had studied
homoerotic play or aggression in the context of sexual harassment, and both
reported that the phenomenon had not been investigated. 0 3 Until we have research
confirming that male-male, on-field butt-smacking is conduct that no "reasonable
person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive [or
pervasive,]"' 4 we should not blindly adopt Justice Scalia's personal calculus and
dicta. The pansexual perspective protects male professional football players, male
construction workers and other traditionally "macho" workers who find butt-
smacking just as demeaning, insulting and intimately invasive as do many male and
female clerical workers.
The female coach raises the same sexual desire issues that the homosexual male
coach presents. If a female coach engages in butt-smacking of male players, some
players-and possibly their wives or partners-may consider that behavior to be a
sexual advance. It is not clear that the playing field neutralizes the butt-smacking.
Using the Court's formulae, females making sexual advances towards males is
reasonably actionable. In this situation, courts would have to discriminate against
women by finding them liable for the exact same behavior for which male
heterosexual coaches would not be held liable.
Finally, women may perceive workplace butt-smacking to be a sexual gesture
no matter where the coach performs it. By permitting such behavior, even between
men, courts reinforce the message that professional sports happen on a "man's
field," and unless women are prepared for butt-smacking, they need not apply.
Examine the scenario of the female sports player. Using Justice Scalia's
"reasonable" presumptions, when a male coach smacks a female player on the
buttocks, is the behavior actionable? Indeed, the behavior is not actionable if the
female player plays on a "coed" team and the coach is an equal opportunity butt-
smacker, whether or not the behavior signifies a sexual advance. The behavior
might be actionable if she plays on a female team, depending again on whether the
behavior constitutes sexual behavior. In Justice Scalia's hypothetical, social context
dictates that male-male on-field butt-smacking is nonsexual. That may or may not
be true. However, what about male-female butt-smacking on the field? Is that also
nonsexual? How do we know if we do not assume that all male coaches are
102. Id. at 69-70. Waldo et al. also found that most men in their sample experienced the enforcement of
heterosexual gender roles as the most upsetting, possibly justifying the labeling of that behavior as sexual
harassment. Id. at 74.
103. Electronic mail from Louise Fitzgerald to Jennifer Drobac (May 1998) (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review); Electronic mail from Craig Waldo to Jennifer Drobac (May 1998) (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
104. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003.
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homosexual? If butt-smacking ever carries a sexual message-and Justice Scalia
concedes that it does in the office-then courts could reasonably conclude that a
male coach who smacks a female player on a female team is harassing her because
of her sex. Thus, on-field butt-smacking perpetrated in the context of a female team
constitutes sexual harassment, but the exact same behavior is not sexual harassment
when performed with a "coed" team or with a team consisting of a heterosexual
coach and "real" men. A gender-neutral, pansexual approach would avoid some of
the ridiculous and discriminatory pitfalls that result when traditional stereotypes,
disguised as "social context,"and prejudices, disguised as "common sense," pollute
the discrimination equation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
'The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality
nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive
as to alter the 'conditions' of the victim's employment."'0 5 Clearly, the offensive
conduct and nature of the injury uniquely identify sexual harassment. Oncale
misplaces the focus on the harasser's motivations, sexual or hostile. Its narrow
interpretation of what constitutes discrimination because of sex threatens the future
of "sexually charged workplace" litigation, and arguably insinuates a mens rea
requirement into the proof of the sexual harassment prima facie case. Additionally,
the court's opinion interrelated biological sex and sexual behavior by using gender
stereotypes to determine whether discrimination "because of ... sex" occurred.
Stereotypes-both latent and.apparent-corrupt Oncale's reasoning and lead to
seemingly ridiculous and inconsistent results. Finally, Oncale's unprecedented and
ill-advised reliance on "common sense" and "social context" threatens the vitality
of Title VII, the civil rights statute passed to correct situations in which "common
sense" and "social context" fail to protect all persons.
Oncale's broad holding-that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under
Title VII-offers great hope for victims of sexual harassment. With a pansexual,
gender-neutral perspective, courts can ferret out discriminatory behaviors without
encountering the traps evident in the Oncale reasoning. The equations consistent
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First is the Price Waterhouse equation that represents illegal gender
stereotyping:
(ei &/or ) + ((stereocenforce + ei) &/or (stereo enforce+ 9)) =
actionable harassment because of sex
Next is the equation that represents severe or pervasive sexual advances:
I (e &/or $) + SEX+ (ei &/or $) = actionable harassment because of sex
Third is the equation that represents sex-specific animus:
(ei &/or ) + ((crhostity + ') &/or ($hostilt+ y )) =
actionable harassment because of sex
And finally comes the equation that represents severely or pervasively sexually
charged workplaces:
(ei or ) + OoSEXOO + (ei or 9) = actionable harassment because of sex
Courts that use these equations to identify discrimination because of sex will avoid
the heterocentrist, sexist and gendered stereotypes that mar Oncale.
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Symbol or Abbreviation Definition





coSEX w infinitely sexual, a sexually charged
work environment
SEX sexual advances or sexual activity
stereoo'enforce enforcement of male stereotypes
stereo 42enforce enforcement of female stereotypes
oxhostifty hostility directed against men
-9fwsti!ty hostility directed against women
lomohostity hostility directed against
homosexuals
